Could a compromised session generate apparently legitimate events?¶

Yes. A person using a stolen or remotely controlled session can make permitted requests under a valid account. The service may record normal success fields because it is validating the session, not observing the person.

Compromise can bypass a fresh login¶

Session cookies and tokens may be copied, malware may act through a browser, or someone may use an unlocked device. The attacker can then browse, download, message or change settings without producing a password failure or obvious new authentication event.

Potential indicators include a new source, device or user agent; overlapping locations; abnormal actions; token use after expected revocation; or activity inconsistent with endpoint records. None is conclusive in isolation.

Trace the session from creation to termination¶

Preserve session identifiers, token issue and refresh events, authentication method, devices, source addresses, risk detections and revocations. Endpoint and browser evidence may show whether the genuine device generated the requests or was under remote control.

Normal-looking fields do not prove legitimate control, but unusual behaviour does not prove theft. A defensible account states what the platform accepted and which evidence supports - or leaves unresolved - the identity of the controller.