Could a payment link redirect to another service?¶

Yes. A payment link may pass through one or several web services before reaching the final checkout or payment provider.

Avoid the dangerous assumption¶

The dangerous assumption is that the domain visible in the message is the service that processed or received the payment.

A shortened URL may redirect to a longer address.

A merchant website may redirect to a payment gateway, wallet, banking application or third-party checkout page.

Tracking and security services may add further redirects.

The final recipient account may therefore sit on a different service from the one first displayed.

Preserve the original link exactly as received and record every observed redirect where this can be done safely and lawfully.

Do not rely only on the page title or branding. Fraudulent pages can imitate genuine providers.

Relevant evidence may include the original URL, redirect chain, destination domain, payment-request ID, merchant account, recipient identifier and linked transaction.

Opening the link from an ordinary investigative device may expose IP address, browser and timing information or trigger single-use behaviour.

Where risk exists, seek specialist support or use an approved controlled environment.

Ask each relevant provider what role it played and which account or transaction its identifier relates to.

A legitimate redirect chain does not prove the payment request was genuine.

Likewise, an unfamiliar intermediate service does not automatically mean the link was malicious.

When reporting, distinguish the original link, intermediate redirects, final checkout provider and ultimate recipient.

Operational takeaway¶

Map the full redirect chain and provider identifiers before deciding which service processed the payment or which account received the funds.